- Kamal Sikder
Darul Ulum Deoband, established in 1866 in the wake of the failed 1857 Indian Rebellion against British rule, stands as one of the most influential Islamic seminaries in South Asia. Founded by prominent scholars including Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, the institution emerged as a bastion of traditional Islamic learning during a period of intense colonial pressure. According to historian Barbara Metcalf, Deoband represented “a deliberate effort to preserve Islamic learning and identity in the face of British domination” (Metcalf, 1982).
The seminary’s educational philosophy was deliberately rooted in the classical Islamic scholarship that had flourished in centres like Baghdad, Cordoba, and Cairo during the Islamic Golden Age (8th-14th centuries). This approach was a conscious rejection of the British educational system, which Deobandi scholars viewed as a tool for cultural imperialism and religious erosion. As scholar Muhammad Qasim Zaman notes, “The Deobandi movement was fundamentally a response to colonial modernity, seeking to preserve what it considered authentic Islamic traditions” (Zaman, 2002).
In contrast to the Deobandi model, the British colonial administration promoted the Alia Madrassa system, first established in Calcutta in 1780 and later expanded through the Wood’s Despatch of 1854, which advocated for a “Western education with an Islamic flavour.” This system aimed to create a class of Muslims who would be loyal to British rule while maintaining their religious identity. Historian David Lelyveld observes that this educational approach was “designed to create a moderate Muslim elite that would serve as intermediaries between the colonial state and the broader Muslim population” (Lelyveld, 1978).
The Deobandi movement viewed this syncretic approach with suspicion, seeing it as an attempt to dilute Islamic principles and create a comprador class. Instead, they emphasized the Dars-e-Nizami curriculum, a comprehensive Islamic studies program developed in 18th century India that covered Quranic exegesis, Hadith studies, Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh), theology (Kalam), Arabic literature, and logic.
Despite their traditional educational approach, the Deobandi ulema (scholars) were not politically passive. In 1919, they established Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Hind (JUH) as their political platform. From its inception, JUH maintained a close alliance with the Indian National Congress, which was founded in 1885. This alliance was based on a shared commitment to Indian nationalism and opposition to British colonial rule. As historian Yogi Sikand notes, “The Deobandi ulema saw no contradiction between their Islamic identity and Indian nationalism, viewing India as their homeland where they could practice Islam freely” (Sikand, 2005).
During the crucial years leading to the partition of India in 1947, JUH, under leaders like Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, vehemently opposed the Muslim League’s demand for a separate Pakistan. Madani’s book “Composite Nationalism and Islam” argued that Muslims and non-Muslims could coexist as equal citizens in a united India, a position that put him at odds with the Two-Nation Theory propounded by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League.
It was in this context that Syed Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) emerged as a formidable intellectual force. Initially associated with the JUH, where he served as editor of their monthly journal, Maududi gradually developed a distinct political theology that emphasized the comprehensive nature of Islam as a complete system governing all aspects of life, including politics. His scholarly prowess earned him the title “Sultan al-Qalam” (King of the Pen) from his contemporaries.
Maududi’s pivotal work “Mas’ala-e-Qaumiyyat” (The Problem of Nationalism) marked a decisive break with JUH’s position. In this book, he criticized the JUH leadership for what he saw as their compromising stance on Islamic principles in pursuit of Hindu-Muslim unity. This led to a permanent rift between Maududi and the Deobandi establishment. In 1941, Maududi founded Jamaat-e-Islami, envisioning it as a vanguard movement dedicated to establishing an Islamic order in South Asia.
The Deobandi scholars, who had traditionally viewed politics with suspicion and often declared it as outside the scope of Islamic scholarship, criticized Maududi’s approach as “Mr. Maududi’s Islam” – implying that it was a modern innovation rather than authentic Islamic tradition. This theological division would have lasting repercussions across South Asia.
Following the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and the subsequent independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the Deobandi tradition continued through the Qaumi madrasa system in Bangladesh. These institutions remained largely outside state control and maintained their traditional curriculum, distinguishing themselves from the Alia madrasas that were incorporated into the national education system.
For decades, the Qaumi ulema maintained their apolitical stance, declaring that politics was not part of their religious mandate. However, this position began to shift dramatically in 1985 when late Hafezzi Huzur, then the de facto leader of the Qaumi ulema, contested the presidential election in Bangladesh, declaring that he had revised his view on politics being forbidden in Islam. This marked the beginning of the Qaumi movement’s direct engagement with electoral politics.
Hafezzi Huzur established the Bangladesh Khelafat Andolon (Caliphate Movement), which later splintered into several factions, including Hefajot-e-Islam Bangladesh, founded in 2010. Initially positioning itself as a non-political movement focused on protecting Islamic values, Hefajot-e-Islam gradually became more politically active, culminating in a massive sit-in protest in Dhaka in 2013 demanding the implementation of blasphemy laws and the abolition of “un-Islamic” policies.
The May 2013 operation against Hefajot-e-Islam’s Dhaka sit-in, conducted during Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government, resulted in numerous casualties according to human rights organizations. This violent crackdown appeared to mark the end of Hefajot’s opposition to the government. In a remarkable political turnaround, Hefajot-e-Islam later became a vocal supporter of Sheikh Hasina, even bestowing upon her the title “Qaumi Janani” (Mother of the Qaumi System).
Critics argue that this transformation was influenced by external factors, particularly the organization’s perceived alignment with Indian interests. As political analyst Ali Riaz notes, “The shifting positions of Hefajot-e-Islam raise questions about the autonomy of Islamic movements in Bangladesh and their susceptibility to external influences” (Riaz, 2018).
In recent months, the current leader of Hefajot-e-Islam, Allama Babunagari, has made several controversial statements targeting Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, the successor to Maududi’s original movement. In September 2025, Babunagari claimed that Jamaat-e-Islami is not an Islamic political party and suggested that if Jamaat came to power, it would ban Qaumi and Sunnati madrasas. These allegations were strongly condemned by Jamaat’s Assistant Secretary General.
These statements come at a particularly sensitive time in Bangladesh’s political landscape. The country is currently in a transitional phase following the July 2024 student-led uprising that ended Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year rule. All political parties are attempting to create an environment of political harmony and stability. Against this backdrop, Babu Nagari’s divisive statements have drawn criticism from various quarters.
Historical context adds another layer of complexity to these tensions. During periods when Hefajot-e-Islam faced government pressure, Jamaat-e-Islami had reportedly come to their defence, maintaining a policy of not making divisive remarks against the Qaumi madrasa movement. This history of mutual restraint makes the current rhetorical escalation particularly noteworthy.
The complex tapestry of Islamic political movements in South Asia, stretching from Deoband’s founding in 1866 to contemporary Bangladesh, reflects the evolving relationship between religious institutions and political power. The current tensions between Hefajot-e-Islam and Jamaat-e-Islami represent not merely a personal or organizational rivalry but a deeper ideological divide that traces its roots to the theological debates of the early 20th century.
As Bangladesh navigates its post-uprising transition, the need for political harmony and responsible discourse has never been greater. Divisive statements from influential religious organizations risk emboldening remnants of the fallen authoritarian regime and destabilizing the fragile political system. The principles of Islamic ethics demand mutual respect and constructive engagement, particularly among those who claim to represent Islamic values.
The historical trajectory of these movements suggests that Islamic politics in South Asia has always been dynamic and adaptive. The current moment presents an opportunity for these organizations to transcend historical divisions and contribute positively to Bangladesh’s democratic development. Only through such constructive engagement can they fulfil their stated mission of serving Islam and the broader community.
References:
1. Metcalf, Barbara D. (1982). Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900. Princeton University Press.
2. Zaman, Muhammad Qasim (2002). The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. Princeton University Press.
3. Lelyveld, David (1978). Aligarh’s First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India. Princeton University Press.
4. Sikand, Yoginder (2005). Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India. Penguin Books.
5. Riaz, Ali (2018). Voting in a Hybrid Regime: Explaining the 2014 Bangladeshi Election. Asian Survey, 58(2), 321-344.
6. Madani, Maulana Husain Ahmad (2005). Composite Nationalism and Islam. Oxford University Press.
7. Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza (1996). Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism. Oxford University Press.
