By Kamal Sikder
On 29 July 2025 at the UN‑organised convention at the InterContinental in Dhaka, Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer Dr Shafiqur Rahman addressed the gathering commemorating the victims of the July uprising. He spoke with a measured calmness, yet his message was sharp and profound, reshaping perceptions both nationally and internationally. Dr Rahman emphasised that, “our martyrs and living martyrs (Injured) are our assets, not burdens”, arguing that the nation must honour and support them. He also affirmed Jamaat’s efforts to document the details of those killed or injured during the uprising, to safeguard historical truth and support victims’ families.
In his remarks, he warned of a resurgence of fascism, stating that if the country fails to acknowledge past injustices, fascist rule may be rooted once more. He made a firm call to fight corruption as the next major national battle.
Dr Rahman’s delivery was calm and measured, yet every line carried weight. His clarity and conviction resonated deeply, leaving many listeners moved. Those who heard him domestically and abroad felt the power of a message that combined moral conviction with political clarity.
Recently, Dr Shafiqur Rahman has emerged as a symbolic figure in Bangladesh, a representation of dignity, assurance, and moral hope. In times when the nation yearns for leadership rooted in integrity, he has become a voice for millions. When such leaders rise, their message doesn’t just echo, it galvanises. His speech reflected this. It was not only a tribute to the fallen, but also a summons to the living to carry forward a principled struggle for justice and reform.
As Bangladesh enters a new phase of political transformation, a once-marginalized force, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI), is poised for an electoral resurgence. Legally rehabilitated and buoyed by a shifting national mood, Jamaat has evolved from pariah to serious contender. Recent polling suggests it may secure 25–30 percent of the popular vote, a remarkable figure for a party banned from elections and all political activities just a decade ago.
While some view this development as a manifestation of democratic pluralism, others, both domestically and internationally, perceive it as a warning sign. The revival of an Islamic party in a country whose identity was forged through a secular-nationalist liberation war in 1971 raises fundamental questions: Can Jamaat reconcile its Islamic roots with democratic governance? Can the electorate trust it not to replicate theocratic regimes? And will the international community engage with a government that may be ideologically Islamic, if electorally legitimate?
Jamaat’s recent rally at Suhrawardy Udyan, symbolically reclaiming a site central to the liberation narrative, was not merely about numbers. It signaled ideological defiance, public confidence, and organizational readiness. More importantly, the party has begun to shed its isolation. Its reform agenda calls for electoral transparency, judicial accountability, and proportional representation, platforms that resonate well beyond its Islamic core.
Repackaging Islamism
Founded on the ideological blueprint of Abul A’la Maududi, Jamaat’s early role in Bangladesh’s political landscape was marred by its opposition to independence and its complicity, real or perceived, in war crimes. Subsequent alliances with a military dictator (General Zia) and conservative coalitions added to its image as a regressive, sectarian force.
Yet the post-2013 period marked a significant reorientation. As a ban forced introspection, Jamaat recalibrated its message. While its theological commitments remain intact, the public discourse now focuses on corruption, institutional decay, economic inequality, and the failures of both Awami League and BNP to deliver democratic accountability.
Social media channels affiliated with Jamaat project an image of a modern, articulate, technocratic movement—youth-led, ethics-driven, and deeply dissatisfied with the status quo. The language has shifted from ‘Islamic State’ to ‘clean governance’, from ‘Islamic rule’ to ‘constitutional reform’.
This rebranding, however, is not without contradiction.
A Vote for Morality, Not Theocracy
Bangladesh remains a deeply religious society, but one that has historically resisted theocratic rule. The success of Jamaat, if it materializes, will not be a sign of mass ideological conversion, but rather protest voting, a reaction to the exhaustion with dynastic politics, authoritarian overreach, and economic mismanagement.
But for Jamaat to move from opposition to governance, it must cross a credibility threshold.
It will need to:
- Publicly affirm pluralism, especially regarding religious minorities and gender equality.
- Reject autocratic models such as Iran and Afghanistan, instead committing to a Bangladeshi synthesis of Islam and democracy.
- Demonstrate governance competence, not just religious piety.
- Avoid rhetoric or policy proposals that suggest a dismantling of secular constitutional pillars.
Failure to do so could result in short-term electoral gain but long-term isolation—both domestically and internationally.
Domestic problem: The bureaucracy
In any modern state, the bureaucracy functions as the backbone of governance, quietly but critically executing the decisions of political leadership. Yet in Bangladesh today, this backbone has become increasingly rigid, and in some cases, unyielding. The current interim government, with limited political mandate but ambitious reformist intentions, finds itself struggling to implement key policies, not due to lack of will or direction, but because of silent resistance within the bureaucratic ranks.
This resistance is not merely administrative. It is ideological and systemic. Many within the upper echelons of the civil service—entrenched for decades—have been shaped by a culture that sees the rise of Jamaat-e-Islami as a threat to their vested interests. Over time, entire ministries have become captive to a network of corruption, nepotism, and informal alliances, where loyalty is often measured not by service to the nation, but by allegiance to political or personal gain. For those who have benefited from such a system, a potential moral or religiously guided administration threatens to disrupt the status quo, and they are unlikely to cooperate willingly.
The risk of non-operation within bureaucracy, especially during a politically fragile transition, could push Bangladesh to the edge of becoming a failed state. The visible erosion of state functions, public services, law enforcement, and regulatory compliance undermines not just development, but the very idea of a cohesive national identity. In this environment, people lose faith, not just in parties or politicians, but in the state itself.
Addressing this crisis will require more than just administrative reshuffles. It demands structural reform, accountability, and a deep cultural shift within government institutions, ideally steered by a coalition of political vision, civil society, and professional sectors like the military, which remain committed to national interest above all.
The path forward is delicate. But if left unaddressed, this bureaucratic resistance will not just hinder reform, it will cripple the future of the nation.
Civil-Military Dynamics: A Historical Caution
While Jamaat’s rhetorical softening may be reshaping civilian perceptions, the stance of Bangladesh’s powerful military establishment remains a critical, if opaque, variable. Historically, the Bangladesh Armed Forces have acted as a guardian of the secular constitutional order, intervening at key points to prevent either civil disorder or ideological radicalization from undermining state stability.
A pertinent comparative lens is the Algerian military’s suppression of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the early 1990s. Despite the FIS winning the first round of parliamentary elections, Algeria’s military nullified the results, fearing the emergence of an Islamic theocracy. The ensuing civil war claimed thousands of lives.
While Bangladesh’s context differs in many respects, especially with a history of electoral pluralism and civil-military boundaries, the military’s institutional memory of Jamaat’s alleged role in 1971, coupled with its long-standing commitment to a secular-nationalist ethos, may limit tolerance for an Islamic party commanding executive authority.
Even if Jamaat were to secure a significant parliamentary presence, a transition toward “Islamic governance” would likely trigger resistance from the security establishment, which might view such a shift as incompatible with Bangladesh’s regional alignments, especially its security ties with India, counter-terrorism pacts with Western allies, and strategic neutrality vis-à-vis China.
In short, while electoral success is hypothetically possible, governing power may remain structurally constrained unless Jamaat undergoes deep doctrinal reform and gains institutional trust, not just public legitimacy.
Regional Optics and Diplomatic Realities
Jamaat’s resurgence will not be assessed in a vacuum. Its rise presents geopolitical complications, particularly for India, Western allies, and even China.
India’s Strategic Anxiety
New Delhi views Jamaat with deep suspicion. For decades, Indian policymakers have regarded the party as pro-Pakistan, anti-Hindu, and ideologically hostile to secular governance. Any indication that Dhaka is tilting toward political Islamism would alarm India’s security and intelligence establishments, especially amid tensions in Assam, Tripura, and the Northeast.
Unless Jamaat explicitly distances itself from pan-Islamic or anti-Indian rhetoric, relations may sour fast. Trade, water sharing, and border cooperation, already fragile, could stall. Jamaat must articulate a non-confrontational, regional foreign policy, ideally emphasizing mutual respect, sovereignty, and economic diplomacy.
The West’s Democratic Caution
The United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union will also observe this transition with skepticism. While the West has tolerated Islamic parties like Ennahda in Tunisia or AKP in early Turkey, it has drawn red lines around issues of free speech, women’s rights, and minority protection.
Should Jamaat come to power, the West’s engagement will hinge on whether the party prioritizes democratic governance over ideological imposition.
China’s Transactional Diplomacy
Interestingly, China may present the least ideological resistance. As long as its strategic investments and infrastructure projects remain protected, Beijing is likely to engage pragmatically. However, any sign of Jamaat aligning itself with Uyghur causes or Islamic solidarity narratives could provoke diplomatic pushback.
Demographic Shifts and Base Realignment
Jamaat’s support is being reconstituted along newer demographic lines. Among madrasa-educated populations and traditional religious scholars, support remains robust, with approval ratings estimated between 65% and 75%. More interestingly, among youth aged 18 to 29—many of whom were not politically active during the war crimes trials of the 2010s—Jamaat has gained surprising traction. These voters are primarily motivated by anti-establishment sentiment, perceived moral integrity, and the party’s emphasis on justice and reform rather than nostalgia for Islamic politics.
However, Jamaat continues to struggle with women voters and urban secular professionals, where its support rarely crosses 10–20%. Despite some cosmetic changes in messaging, the party still lacks prominent female leadership and has not issued a robust platform on gender equity, an issue that remains vital in urban constituencies.
Regional Power Bases and Electoral Geography
Regionally, Jamaat’s strength is concentrated in the northern and southwestern divisions, particularly in Rangpur, Khulna, and parts of Rajshahi. These areas have historically served as Jamaat strongholds, bolstered by extensive da’wah networks, local charity operations, and madrasa affiliations. Sylhet presents a mixed picture: while urban areas remain skeptical, there is an increase in support in rural Sylheti belts.
In contrast, urban divisions like Dhaka, Barishal, and Chattogram remain difficult terrain. Here, secular middle-class voters, coupled with influential legacy media outlets and civil society actors, remain largely hostile.
The Electoral Mechanics: Why 25% – 30% May Not Equal Power
Despite polling strength, Jamaat’s potential seat count under the First Past the Post (FPTP) system may remain limited. Bangladesh’s electoral geography favours concentrated support, not national spread. Regionally, Jamaat’s strength lies in Rangpur, Khulna, Rajshahi, and parts of Chattogram (Cox’s Bazar and adjacent constituencies of Chattogram). These are not just symbolic regions; they are vote-rich and, critically, areas where Awami League influence has sharply declined post-2024. If Jamaat converts its current national support of 25–30% into concentrated constituency wins under the first-past-the-post electoral system, it could win upwards of 70–100 seats, a dramatic leap from its historical highs of 17–18 seats under alliance configurations in 1991 and 2001. Unless Jamaat’s vote is regionally focused, such as in Upper North Region, North-west, and the South, it may secure 25–40 seats rather than the 80–100 that a proportional system, if introduced, would yield.
Of course, success hinges on several unresolved variables. While BNP has publicly ruled out an alliance with Jamaat to retain its appeal among urban moderates and the international community, electoral pragmatism may still encourage seat-level coordination. At the same time, Jamaat is exploring alliances with other Islamic parties, Islami Andolon, Khilafat Majlish, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam—though ideological rivalry and leadership tussles remain barriers.
Nonetheless, in a fragmented parliament, that range may be enough to become a coalition kingmaker or even lead a third-force government.
A Defining Moment
The return of Jamaat to political relevance marks a critical juncture for Bangladesh. It tests the boundaries of democratic inclusion, challenges the legacy of the liberation narrative, and demands that both voters and international partners recalibrate their understanding of what Islamism in Bangladesh means today.
Jamaat now stands at a crossroads: Retain ideological purity and remain a protest force, or evolve, compromise, and govern.
Jamaat-e-Islami’s path to national leadership runs through a minefield of memory, suspicion, and ideological discomfort. If it fails to evolve beyond its historical baggage, it may win seats but lose the soul of the nation. But if it can convincingly demonstrate a commitment to democratic pluralism, while retaining moral conviction, it may carve out a historic role in shaping a new, post-partisan Bangladesh.
That role, however, will not just be judged by voters in Rangpur or Khulna. It will be watched intently by diplomats in New Delhi, DC, and Beijing. For Jamaat, power will come with pressure, and legitimacy will come only through restraint, reform, and responsibility.
The road ahead will be determined not just by votes, but by visions of statehood, models of legitimacy, and the party’s ability to reassure a world that is still haunted by the ghosts of theological absolutism.
What’s clear is that Jamaat’s resurrection is not a return to the past. It is entering a changed Bangladesh, where its future will depend on whether it can convince a new generation of voters that it has learned from history, not merely survived it. Whether that narrative succeeds will define whether Jamaat becomes a kingmaker, a ruling coalition partner, or merely an artefact of revivalist politics in a fractured democratic landscape.
But one thing is no longer in doubt: Jamaat is back. And it’s being taken seriously.
